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ABSTRACT 
 
Paper argues that managers have the obligation to make choices and take actions that will 
contribute to the welfare and interests of society as well as the organisation. Social responsible 
behaviour is actually in a company's self interest. Therefore the company must take the social 
consequences into account when formulating strategies. Still there are those scholars who argue 
that considerations of social responsibility should not enter into the decision process. However, 
many institutional investors pay attention to corporate social behaviour and thus influence the 
market for a company's stock. Our conclusions are based on a longitudinal research method. We 
made three consecutive research studies on the characteristics of corporate governance in 
Slovenia in the period 1998 to 2006. We compare the results of our studies made in 1998 and 
2002 with the latest results in 2006. The most important long-term strategic objective of Slovenian 
companies is growth. The share of Slovenian companies not considering equity opportunity costs 
has decreased significantly in the last six years due to the consolidation of ownership structures. 
The controlling owners are more active in setting the required rate of return on their equity 
investments. There is no conflict of interests between internal and external shareholders in most 
companies. Obviously, Slovenian companies have changed their strategic behaviour to reflect the 
interests of their stakeholders. We may argue that some stakeholders, like customers and 
employees, are even more important for Slovenian managers than the owners.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
y the term social responsibility we understand the obligation of organization management to make 
decisions and take actions that will enhance the welfare and interests of society as well as the 
organization. One reason for the difficulty to understanding social responsibility is that managers must 
confront the question »responsibility to whom«? From a social responsibility perspective, enlightened organizations 
view the internal and external environment as a variety of stakeholders (Daft, Marcis, 2001, p.118). The Effective 
corporate governance ensures that long-term strategic objectives and plans are established, and that the proper 
management and management structure are in place to achieve those objectives, while at the same time making sure 
the structure functions to maintain the corporation’s integrity, reputation, and accountability to its relevant 
constituencies. In recent times, more than half of the states in the US have passed stakeholders laws, which permit or 
even require directors to consider the impact of their actions on constituencies other than shareholders, including the 
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community. This is in contrast to the traditional model of publicly held 
corporation which says that corporate directors serve only one constituency – their shareholders (Monks, Minow, 
2001, p.37).      
 
 Our paper offers some insights into the characteristics of the corporate governance system in Slovenia. We 
made three consecutive research studies on the characteristics of corporate governance in Slovenia in the period 
1998 to 2006. We compare the results of our studies made in 1998 and 2002 with the latest results in 2006. Our 
empirical research was based on a fully-structured interview that was prepared with pre-coded responses. A firm had 
to have specific characteristics to fall within the research sample: 
 
B 
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1. it should have had at least 250 employees;  
2. it should have had at least USD 5 million in annual income; and 
3. it should have been a joint-stock company. 
 
This study is based on a research sample of 69 companies that met these criteria. 
 
In order to determine the dynamic of the strategic behaviour of managers in the last eight years we compare 
the top managers' values in our research 2006 with the research made by Kalacun in 2000. The results of the three 
longitudinal studies regarding investment decisions of managers in the years 1998, 2002 and 2006 have been 
compared. We try to determine the most important characteristics of the strategic behaviour of managers in Slovenia 
in the last period of transition and the changing pattern of corporate governance in Slovenia.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
A corporation is a mechanism established to allow different parties to contribute capital, expertise, and 
labour for the maximum benefit of all of them. Corporation offer lasting and resilient social structure (Monks, 
Minow, 2001, p. 11).  In order to qualify as a moral agent, a corporation would need to embody a process of moral 
decision making. The perennial question is whether business can do well by doing good (Donaldson, 1982, p.30).  
Some companies have made the social responsibility part of their marketing strategy. Consumers can feel less guilty 
about buying arguably decadent products if they know that by doing so they are supporting good causes. At one end 
of the scale are the most basic aspects of social responsibility, like compliance with the law. At the other end of the 
scale are activities so unrelated to the goods and services sold that pursuing them is considered by the marketplace to 
be irrelevant to the company’s productivity. 
 
Proponents of corporate social responsibility have used four arguments to make their case: moral 
obligation, sustainability, license to operate, and reputation (Porter, 2004, p. 81). However studies of the effect of a 
company's social reputation on consumer purchasing preferences or on stock market performance have been 
inconclusive at best. Having no way to quantify the benefits of these investments puts corporate social responsibility 
programs on shaky ground, liable to be dislodged by a change of management or a swing in the business cycle.    
 
In practice, it is possible to distinguish between three levels of company responsibility. The primary level 
comprises the company’s responsibilities to meet its material obligations to shareholders, employees, customers, 
suppliers and creditors, to pay its taxes and to meet its statutory duties. The sanctions against failure to match up to 
these relatively easy defined and measured responsibilities are provided by competition and the law. The next level 
of responsibility is concerned with the direct results of the actions of companies in carrying out their primary task 
and includes making the most of the community’s human resources and avoiding damage to the environment. 
Beyond these two levels, there is a much less well defined area of responsibility, which takes in the interaction 
between business and society in a wider sense. On this level it is a question how far has business a responsibility to 
maintain the framework of the society in which it operates and how far should business reflect society’s priorities 
rather than its own commercial one. Some other authors also tried to develop a model for evaluating social 
performance of companies (see Figure 1).    
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Figure 1:  Model for evaluating corporate social performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Archie B. Carroll: The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Corporate 
Stakeholders, Business Horizons, 34 (July-August) 1991. Daft R., Marcic D.: Understanding Management, 2001, p. 122. 
 
 
Among the key findings of a SIRAN analysis of the reporting practices companies in the S&P 100 INDEX 
(www.socialinvest.org): 
 
 More than half of the S&P 100 Index (58 companies) have special sections of their websites dedicated to 
sharing information about their social and environmental policies and performance. 
 Almost 40 percent of the S&P 100 Index (39 companies) now issue annual corporate social responsibility 
reports. 
 24% of companies of the S&P 100 Index say they base their corporate social responsibility reports on the 
widely recognized external standard provided by the Global Reporting Initiative's Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines. 20% of companies included an index to Global Reporting Initiative indicators in their reports. 
6% of companies met the highest standard of reporting fully in accordance with the Global Reporting 
Initiative guidelines.  
 Of those companies issuing annual Corporate Social Responsibility reports, 62% say their reports are based 
on Global Reporting Initiative standards, and 51% include an index to Global Reporting Initiative 
indicators.        
 
The basis of a corporation's existence is wealth maximization. There is no such thing as a good corporation 
that is not completely profitable. Corporations live in a world where the market determines what people will buy and 
what they will pay. A corporation that does not produce goods that people want at a price they are willing to pay has 
no reason to exist. On the other hand we want the corporation to work wit us to keep the workplace and the 
environment safe. We want a continual sense of progress and growth from our corporations. We want our interest in 
the company whether as shareholder, employee, customer, supplier, creditor or just neighbor to be designed for the 
long run. Moreover, managers should take care to satisfy the interests of their primary stakeholders. In theory, 
corporations support the free market, with as little interference from government as possible. In reality, whenever 
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corporations can persuade the government to protect them from the free market, by legislating barriers to 
competition or limiting their ability, they do so. In practice, corporations have influenced government at least as 
much as government has influenced business (Monks, Minow, 2001, p. 16). Shareholders expect managers to run 
their business in a way that will encourage a supportive governmental and societal climate to capitalist enterprise.  
 
The property-based concept of the firm has prevailed in the Anglo-Saxon world. The Chicago School of 
Law and Economics treats the company as a nexus of contracts through which the stakeholders regulate transactions 
between each other. In this theory, the company’s assets are the property of the shareholders, and managers are 
viewed as agents of the shareholders with all of the enforcement difficulties associated with agency relationships, 
but without legal obligations to any other stakeholder. This view maintains that the rights of creditors, employees 
and others are strictly limited to statutory, contractual and common law rights (Allen, 1992). Any broadening of a 
company’s social obligations was dangerous, according to this school of thought (Clarke, 1997, p. 185). Milton 
Friedman once said: »Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the foundations of our free society as the 
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their shareholders 
as possible« (1962, p. 113). Hayek added that, once the management of a corporation is regarded as not only being 
entitled but even obliged to consider in its decisions whatever is regarded as being of a social interest, it gains 
uncontrollable power. In this case, managers would become the subject of the public interest (1979, p. 79). These 
views expressed by neo-liberal economists strongly influenced the corporate governance system of the Anglo-Saxon 
world in the 1970s and 1980s. Managers were mostly oriented to short-term financial objectives such as sustaining 
the share price and dividend payments at all costs. We can identify a substantial numbers of mergers and 
acquisitions in this period that were pursued to discipline managers. Monks and Minow (2001, p. 81) attempted to 
restate the essential principles of the shareholder theory of the firm. Their approach allows all other interests to be 
factored in without losing sight of the goal of long-term wealth maximisation. It is difficult enough to determine the 
performance of a company’s strategy based on just one goal, namely shareholder value. It is impossible when we 
add in other goals. Therefore, the only way to determine a company’s performance is to consider the long-term 
shareholder value (Clarke, 1997, p. 186).  
 
The modern corporation typically has multiple owners who each intend to maximise their investment in the 
corporation. Owners become principals when they contract with executives to manage their firms on their behalf. 
Thus, in the modern corporation agents and principals are motivated by opportunities for their own personal gain. 
Principals invest their wealth in companies and design the corporate governance mechanism in ways that maximise 
their utility. The chance that agents do not share the same interests and utility choices as their principals is 
substantial (Davis et al., 1997, p. 22). According to the agency theory, it is difficult for principals to determine ex-
ante which agents will self-aggrandise and so it is prudent for principals to limit potential losses to their utility 
(Williamson, 1985).  
 
Some management studies have suggested that managers make different decisions when owners are 
actively involved in the firm (owner-controlled) versus the situation where paid managers are relatively free to set 
the firm’s strategy (Tosi, Katz, Gomez, 1997; McEachern, 1975). Thus, firms become controlled by managers when 
the firm’s shares are so disparately owned that no single shareholder is able to effectively guide the decisions of 
managers. The objective in agency theory is to reduce the agency costs incurred by principals by imposing internal 
controls to keep the agent’s self-serving behaviour in check. There are various internal and external (acquisitions, 
divestitures) corporate governance control mechanisms to prevent the agency problem. Two corporate governance 
mechanisms that have attracted substantial attention in the literature are alternative executive compensation schemes 
and governance structures.  
 
An alternative view is the stakeholder theory of the firm. The philosophical antecedents of stakeholder 
theory date back to the 19th century, to the conception of co-operative movement and mutuality. In »The Theory of 
the Growth of the Firm«, Edith Penrose laid the intellectual foundations for stakeholder theory in her concept of the 
company as a bundle of human assets and relationships. In his work, Clark thoroughly described the development of 
the stakeholder theory approach (1997, pp. 186-187). Hill and Jones (1992) expanded the standard principal-agent 
paradigm to the stakeholder agency problem. In this view, managers can be seen as the agents of all stakeholders. 
With the onset of knowledge-based competition (Buckley, Carter, 2000, pp. 55-71; Teece, 2000, pp. 35-54), this 
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approach will be even more important in the near future. If knowledge is a predominant productive resource and 
most knowledge is created by and stored within individuals, then employees are also the primary stakeholders 
(Grant, 1997). The stakeholder theory approach has been applied to performance management theory. The growing 
emphasis is on customer relationship management, employee relationships, supplier relationships, the relations with 
investors and with the local community. Some well-known approaches such as the European Foundation for Quality 
Management or Balanced Scorecard system try to cover performance in all key relationships (Kaplan, Norton, 1996; 
European Foundations for Quality Management, 1993). The fundamental issue is how to satisfy the interests of more 
complex constituencies than shareholder theory might suggest. 
 
Traditional theory of the firm argues that the arguments advancing a constituency for corporate functioning 
are miscast. It is difficult enough to determine the success of a company’s strategy based on only one goal – 
shareholder value. It is impossible when we add in other goals. The only way to evaluate the success of a company’s 
performance is to consult those who have the most direct and wide-reaching interest in the results of that 
performance – the shareholders. Only owners have the motive to inform themselves and to enforce standards that 
arguably are a proxy for the public interest (Monks, Minow, 2001, p. 40). 
 
THE RESULTS OF OUR STUDY 
 
Internal owners control the majority-voting share in 34% of the companies (see Figure 2). The share of the 
state has been decreased in last eight years, however it's still higher as it is in other EU member states.  
 
 
Figure 2:  The most influential stakeholder in the process of corporate governance 
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In the first period of transition 1991-1998, the consolidation of business activities has been the most 
important strategic priority. On the other hand growth has been the most important long-term strategic objective of 
Slovenian companies for last eight years (see Figure 3). Creating value for shareholders is the most important long-
term strategic objective in a relatively small number of companies. This finding could be problematic from the 
agency problem point of view if the company is in a mature or even a declining industry. Jensen argued that the 
likelihood of the agency problem occurring is considerably greater in a declining industry. Instead of developing a 
consolidation strategy, managers are in many cases still oriented towards growth (1988, page 46). On the other hand, 
we are faced with a convergence of interests if an industry is growing. In such a case, the opportunities for growth 
within that industry usually also result in the maximisation of shareholder value. No company in our research 
sample would formulate the maximisation of employees’ income as the key strategic objective. As already pointed 
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out, the most important strategic objectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, they somehow do 
show the strategic priorities on one hand and the influence on the corporate governance process of the stakeholders 
on the other.  
 
 
Figure 3:  The most important long-term strategic objective 
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In order to create value for shareholders managers should consider the concept of »EVA« (economic value 
added concept) (Miller, Dess, 1996, page 122). One problem of using traditional financial accounting information to 
measure profitability is that it does not take into account the opportunity cost of equity capital. We care about 
financial returns because of their importance to owners as a stakeholder group, so overlooking the owners’ 
investment costs leads to a serious oversight (McCrory, Gerstberger, 1992, page 33-38). Equity is often a very 
expensive source of capital and ignoring it misrepresents the amount of economic value the business is creating for 
the shareholders. Controlling owners are more active in setting the required rate of return on their equity 
investments. In over one-third of companies, managers assumed that in 2002 the opportunity cost on equity 
investment is 10%, which was higher than the cost of long-term debt. The share of such companies decreased in 
2006 due to the decreasing interest rates (see Figure 4).  
 
In our research that was conducted in 2006 we found out that managers in 42.1% of companies, when 
valuing an investment opportunity, do not consider the opportunity costs of equity capital or assume that such cost is 
zero. In our previous research conducted in Slovenian companies in 1998, the percentage share of these companies 
was far greater (90.5%). The share of Slovenian companies that do not consider equity opportunity costs has 
dropped significantly in the last eight years due to the consolidation process of ownership structures (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 4:  The opportunity cost of equity investment considered by managers when calculating the weighted average costs 
of capital 
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Figure 5:  Managers who not consider the equity opportunity costs 
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Managers and internal owners have managed to forge specific coalitions in many companies that are 
controlled by insiders. These companies are in fact controlled by managers and they behave differently to companies 
controlled by strategic outside investors. An insider-dominated firm may generate neither the resources needed for 
restructuring activities, such as investment, nor have the incentive to sell the firm to outsiders who have those 
resources (Blanchard, Anghion, 1995). Prašnikar and Svejnar (1998, page 19) found some strong arguments in their 
research to support this thesis regarding the role of insiders in Slovenian companies. For example, in the cases of 
some takeover bids managers and the internal owners forged a specific coalition because they were afraid of losing 
their jobs. In such a case, the takeover bid failed even though it would have enhanced the competitive position of 
merged company in the market. However, the fear of reorganisation and losing jobs due to the sharing of activities 
between companies prevailed and there was no reselling of shares by internal owners to strategic outsiders.  
 
In our last research in the year 2006 we found out that the most important value of the managers in 
Slovenia is growth and development of their companies (4.51), followed by customers' satisfaction (4.49) and 
employees' satisfaction (4.38). Profit maximisation (3.93) and shareholder value (3.84) are surprisingly less 
important as well as the ecological issues (3.81). By comparing our results with the earlier research made by 
Kalacun in 2000, we found out that the managers in Slovenia have stable values (see Figure 6). Kalacun found in her 
research (2000, page 23) that the most important values of Slovenian managers are the following: growth and 
development of the company (4.59), customers’ satisfaction (4.47), employees’ satisfaction (4.41) and ecological 
issues (4.03). Therefore, we may argue that some stakeholders, like customers and employees, are even more 
important for Slovenian managers than the owners.  
 
 
Figure 6:  The most important values of Slovenian managers 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Studies of the effect of a company's social reputation on consumer purchasing preferences or on stock 
market performance have been inconclusive at best. From a social responsibility perspective, enlightened 
organizations view the internal and external environment as a variety of stakeholders. Slovenian companies have 
changed their strategic behaviour to reflect the interests of their stakeholders. According to our research we may 
argue that some stakeholders, like customers and employees, are even more important for Slovenian managers than 
the owners. The most important long-term strategic objective of Slovenian companies is growth and development. 
On one hand the share of Slovenian companies not considering equity opportunity costs has decreased significantly 
in the last eight years due to the consolidation of ownership structures. The controlling owners are more active in 
setting the required rate of return on their equity investments. On the other hand customers have a significant impact 
on the strategic decisions of the companies involved in our research. This is very positive and reflects a long-term 
strategic partnership between companies and their key customers. According to the results of our studies that have 
been conducted in last few years we can argue that the stakeholder theory is the leading corporate governance 
approach in Slovenia. The growing emphasis is on customer relationship management, employee relationships and 
supplier relationships as well as the partnership with the local community. 
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